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1 Introduction
Every physicist knows the rule for combining several experimental results:
µ =
∑
i di/s
2
i∑
i 1/s
2
i
(1)
σ(µ) =
(∑
i
1/s2i
)− 1
2
, (2)
where ‘µ’ refers to the true value and di± si stands for the individual data point (the use
of si, instead of the usual σi, for the standard uncertainty reported by the experiments
will become clear later; similarly, the meaning of ‘µ’ and of σ(µ) have not been well
defined for the moment, as they will be better defined later). The above rule, hereafter
called standard combination rule, is based on some hypotheses which are worth recalling:
i) all measurements refer to the same quantity; ii) the measurements are independent;
iii) the probability distribution of di around µ is described by a Gaussian distribution
with standard deviation given by σi = si. If one, or several, of these hypotheses are not
satisfied, the result of Eqs. (1)–(2) is questionable.
Now we are confronted with the problem that we are never absolutely sure if these
hypotheses are true or not. If we were absolutely convinced that the hypotheses were
correct, there would be no reason to hesitate to apply Eqs. (1)–(2), no matter how ‘ap-
parently incompatible’ the data points might appear. But we know by experience that
unrecognized sources of systematic errors might affect the results, or that the uncertainty
associated with the recognized sources might be underestimated (but we also know that,
often, this kind of uncertainty is prudently overstated. . . ).
As is always the case in the domain of uncertainty, there is no ‘objective’ method
for handling this problem; neither in deciding if the data are in mutual disagreement,
nor in arriving at a universal solution for handling those cases which are judged to be
troublesome. Only good sense gained by experience can provide some guidance. Therefore,
all automatic ‘prescriptions’ should be considered cum grano salis. For example, the usual
method for checking the hypothesis that ‘the data are compatible with each other’ is to
make a χ2 test. The hypothesis is accepted if, generally speaking, the χ2 does not differ
too much from the expected value. As a strict rule, the χ2 test is not really logically
grounded (see e.g. Section 1.8 of Ref. [1]) although it does ‘often work’, due to implicit
hypotheses which are external to the standard χ2 test scheme (see Section 8.7 of Ref. [1]),
but which lead to mistaken conclusions when the unstated hypotheses are not reasonable
(see e.g. Section 1.9 of Ref. [1]). Therefore, I shall not attempt here to quantify the degree
of suspicion. I shall assume a situation in which experienced physicists, faced with a set
of results, tend to be uneasy about the mutual consistency of the picture that those data
offer.
As an example, let us consider the results of Table 1, which are also reported
in a graphical form in Fig. 1. Figure 2 shows also the combined result obtained using
Eqs. (1)–(2), as well as some combinations of subsamples of the results. These results
have not been chosen as the best example of disagreeing data, but because of the physics
interest, and also because the situation is at the edge of where one starts worrying. The
impression of uneasiness is not only because the mutual agreement among the experimen-
tal results is not at the level one would have wished, but also because the value of Re(ǫ′/ǫ)
around which the experimental results cluster is somewhat far from the theoretical eval-
uations (see e.g. Refs. [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] and references therein). Now, it is clear that
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Table 1: Published results on Re(ǫ′/ǫ) (values in units of 10−4). Data points indicated by
√
have been used for quantitative evaluations. Owing to correlations between the 1988 and 1993
uncertainties of NA31, only the combined value published in 1993 is used protect[6].
Experiment Central value ±σstat ± σsyst σtot
√
E731 (1988) [2] 32 ±28± 12 30
NA31 (1988)[3] 33 ±6.6 ± 8.3 11√
E731 (1993)[4] 7.4 ±5.2 ± 2.9 5.9
NA31 (1993)[5] 20 ±4.3 ± 5.0 7√
NA31 (1988+1993)[5, 6] 23.0 ±4 ± 5 6.5√
KTeV (1999)[7] 28.0 ±3.0 ± 2.8 4.1√
NA48 (1999)[8] 18.5 ±4.5 ± 5.8 7.3
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Figure 1: Results on Re(ǫ′/ǫ) obtained at CERN (solid line) and Fermilab (dashed line), where
e = Re(ǫ′/ǫ)× 104.
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Figure 2: Some combinations of the experimental results obtained using the standard com-
bination rule of Eqs. (1)–(2). Upper plot: old results (dashed line), 1999 results (solid line),
overall combination (dotted grey line). Lower plot: CERN experiments (solid line), Fermilab
experiments (dashed), overall combination (dotted grey line).
experimentalists should not be biased towards theoretical expectations, and the history
of physics teaches us about wrong results published to please theory. But we are also aware
of unexpected results (either claims of new physics, or simply a quantitative disagreement
with respect to the global scenario offered by other results within the framework of the
Standard Model) which finally turn out to be false alarms. In conclusion, given the present
picture of theory versus experiments about ǫ′/ǫ, there is plenty of room for doubt: Doubt
about theory, about individual experiments, and about experiments as a whole.
In this situation, drawing conclusions based on a blind application of Eqs. (1)–(2)
seems a bit na¨ıve. For example, a straightforward conclusion of the standard combination
rule leads to a probability that Re(ǫ′/ǫ) is smaller than zero of the order of 0.5 × 10−14,
and I don’t think that experienced physicists would share without hesitation beliefs of
this order of magnitude.
This paper deals with modelling the beliefs of an experienced sceptical physicist
confronted with results of this kind, continuing on from a recent work of Dose and von
der Linden on outliers [14].
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2 Hypotheses behind the simple combination rule
Equation (1) has been written, on purpose, in a way that might be misleading,
although this is the way in which it often appears. In fact, taken literally, it says that µ
is equal to the right-hand side of Eq. (1). Instead, as is well understood, this is just the
value around which our beliefs are centred, usually referred to as the estimator. Given a
Gaussian model, the estimator given by Eq. (1) corresponds to the value which we believe
mostly (mode), and also to the barycentre of the probability distribution1) of µ (expected
value) and to the value which defines two semi-open intervals in each of which we believe
µ to lie with equal probability (median).
In order to obtain a combination rule different from Eqs. (1)–(2), it is important to
remember where these formulae come from. Although this rule is usually taught in the
framework of maximum likelihood, the most general way to get it is by using Bayesian
inference, as we shall show now.
The simplest way to write Bayes’ theorem for continuous variables is:
f(µ | d) ∝ f(d |µ) · f◦(µ) , (3)
where the set of data points {d1, d2, . . . , dn} is indicated by d; the function f(µ | d) is
the final probability density function (p.d.f.) of µ in the light of the experimental results
and of all other prior knowledge about measurement and measurand; f(d |µ) represents
the likelihood of observing the data set d under the hypothesis that the true value is
exactly µ; f◦(µ) is the prior p.d.f. of µ. The proportionality factor is obtained by the
normalization condition
∫
f(µ | d) dµ = 1. The assumption that each of the observed values
is normally distributed around µ with standard deviation σi and that the measurements
are independent leads to
f(d |µ) =
∏
i
1√
2 π σi
exp
[
−(di − µ)
2
2 σ2i
]
. (4)
If the experimental resolution described by the likelihood is sufficiently high and µ is
a quantity which can assume, in principle, values in a large interval (virtually any real
values), a uniform prior distribution, i.e. f◦(µ) = k, is a very reasonable assumption. In
fact, any other mathematical function which models the vagueness of the prior knowledge
(with respect to what the measurement is supposed to yield) acts in practice as a constant
in the region of µ where the likelihood varies rapidly. Putting all the ingredients together
and renormalizing the final p.d.f. we get
f(µ | d, indep. Gaussians, σ, f◦(µ) = k) = 1√
2 π σ(µ)
exp
[
−(µ − E[µ])
2
2 σ2(µ)
]
, (5)
where
E[µ] =
∑
i di/s
2
i∑
i 1/s
2
i
(6)
σ(µ) =
(∑
i
1/s2i
)− 1
2
, (7)
1) Following physics intuition, we consider it natural to talk about probability of true values. For his-
torical reasons, this point of view is currently known by the somewhat esoteric name of Bayesian,
to distinguish it from the so-called frequentistic point of view, according to which the category of
probable should not be applied to true values and, generally speaking, to hypotheses. For a physicist’s
introduction to Bayesian reasoning see Ref. [1], or Ref. [15] for a short account.
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obtained assuming that the σi of Eq. (4) are exactly equal to the quoted stated uncer-
tainties si. In Eq. (5) all conditions have been explicitly stated. This derivation shows
that there is indeed a fourth important implicit assumption in order to arrive at Eqs.
(1)–(2), namely a uniform prior2) on µ. This is why the maximum belief coincides with
the maximum of the likelihood, and why the best estimate of µ is the same as is ob-
tainable from the maximum likelihood principle. Nevertheless, the route followed here is
more general and more intuitive, as discussed extensively in Ref. [1]. In particular, one
can speak consistently about probability of true values, a concept close to the natural
reasoning of physicists [17].
3 Probabilistic modelling of scepticism
Once we have understood what is behind the simple combination rule, it is possible
to change one of the hypotheses entering Eq. (5). Obviously, the problem has no unique
solution. This depends to a great extent on the status of knowledge about the experiments
which provided the results. For example, if one has formed a personal idea concerning the
degree of reliability of the different experimental teams, one can attribute different weights
to different results, or even disregard results considered unreliable or obsolete (for example
their corrections for systematic effects could depend on theoretical inputs which are now
considered to be obsolete). Wishing to arrive at a solution which, with all the imaginable
limitations a general solution may have, is applicable to many situations without an inside,
detailed knowledge of each individual experiment, we have to make some choices. First,
we decide that our sceptic is democratic, i.e. ‘he’ has no a priori preference for a particular
experiment. Second, the easiest way of modelling his scepticism, keeping the mathematics
simple, is to consider the likelihood still Gaussian, but with a standard deviation which
might differ from that quoted by the experimentalists by a factor ri which is not exactly
known:
ri =
σi
si
. (8)
The uncertainty about ri can be described by a p.d.f. f(ri). This uncertainty changes each
factor appearing in the likelihood (4), as can be evaluated by the probability rules:
f(di |µ) =
∫
f(di |µ, ri) · f(ri) dri , (9)
with
f(di |µ, ri, si) = 1√
2 π ri si
exp
[
−(di − µ)
2
2 r2i s
2
i
]
. (10)
If one believes that all ri are exactly one, i.e. f(ri) = δ(ri−1) ∀ i, the standard combination
rule is recovered. Because of our basic assumption of democracy, the mathematical expres-
sion of the p.d.f. of ri will not depend on i, therefore we shall talk hereafter, generically,
about r and f(r).
2) For those used to frequentistic methods, in which ‘there are no priors’, I would like to recall how
Gauss [16] derived his famous Gaussian distribution describing experimental errors. He made explicit
use of the concepts of prior and posterior probability of hypotheses, and derived a formula equivalent
to Bayes’ theorem valid for a priori equiprobable hypotheses (condition explicitly stated). Then, using
some symmetry arguments, plus the condition that the final distribution is maximized when the true
value of the quantity equals the arithmetic average of the measurements, he obtained the functional
form of the error distribution (playing the role of likelihood), which is now named after him.
6
A solution to the problem of finding a parametrization of f(r) such that this p.d.f. is
acceptable to experienced physicists, even though the integral (9) still has a closed form,
has been proposed by Dose and von der Linden [14]; an improved version of it will be used
in this paper [18]. Following Ref. [14], we choose initially the variable ω = 1/r2 = s2i /σ
2
i ,
and consider it to be described by a gamma distribution:
f(ω) =
λδ ωδ−1 e−λω
Γ(δ)
, (11)
where λ and δ are the so-called scale and shape parameters, respectively. As a function of
these two parameters, expected value and variance of ω are E[ω] = δ/λ and Var(ω) = δ/λ2.
Using probability calculus we get the p.d.f of r:
f(r | λ, δ) = 2 λ
δ r−(2 δ+1) e−λ/r
2
Γ(δ)
, (12)
where the parameters have been written explicitly as conditionands for the probability
distribution. Expected value and variance of r are:
E[r] =
√
λΓ(δ − 1/2)
Γ(δ)
(13)
Var(r) =
λ
δ − 1 −
λΓ2(δ − 1/2)
Γ2(δ)
, (14)
existing simultaneously if λ > 0 and δ > 1.
The individual likelihood, integrated over the possible values of r, is obtained by
inserting Eqs. (10) and (12) in Eq. (9):
f(di |µ, si) = λ
δ
√
2 πsi
Γ(δ + 1/2)
Γ(δ)
(
λ+
(di − µ)2
2 s2i
)−(δ+1/2)
. (15)
Using a uniform prior distribution for µ, and remembering that we are dealing with
independent results, we have finally:
f(µ | d, s) ∝ f(d | s, µ) ∝
∏
i
(
λ+
(di − µ)2
2 s2i
)−(δ+1/2)
, (16)
where s = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}. The normalization factor can be determined numerically. Equa-
tion (16) should be written, more properly, as f(µ | d, s, λ, δ), to remind us that the solution
depends on the choice of λ and δ, and teaches us how to get a solution which takes into
account all reasonable choices of the parameters:
f(µ | d, s) =
∫
f(µ | d, s, λ, δ) · f(λ, δ) dλdδ , (17)
where f(λ, δ) quantifies the confidence on each possible pair of parameters.3)
A natural constraint on the values of the parameters comes from the request
E[r] = 1, modelling the assumption that the σ’s agree, on average, with the stated
3) λ and δ are the same for all experiments as we are modelling a democratic scepticism. In general they
could depend on the experiment, thus changing Eq. (16).
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Figure 3: Distribution of the rescaling factor r = σtrue/σest using the parametrizations of
Eq. (12) for several values of the set of parameters (λ, δ); the solid line corresponds to what will
be taken as the reference distribution in this paper, yielding E[r] = σ(r) = 1, and it is obtained
for λ ≈ 0.6 and δ ≈ 1.3. Dotted and dashed lines show the p.d.f. of r yielding σ(r) = 0.5 and
1.5, respectively.
uncertainties. The standard deviation of the distribution gives another constraint. Conser-
vative considerations suggest σ(r)/E[r] ≈ O(1). The condition E[r] = σ(r) = 1 is obtained
for λ ≈ 0.6 and δ ≈ 1.3. The resulting p.d.f. of r is shown as the continuous line of Fig. 3.
One can see that the parametrization of f(r) corresponds qualitatively to intuition: the
barycentre of the distribution is 1; values below r ≈ 1/2 are considered practically impos-
sible; on the other hand, very large values of r are conceivable, although with very small
probability, indicating that large overlooked systematic errors might occur. Anyway, we
feel that, besides general arguments and considerations about the shape of f(r) (to which
we are not used), what matters is how reasonable the results look. Therefore, the method
has been tested with simulated data, shown in the left plots of Fig. 4.
For simplicity, all individual results are taken to have the same standard deviation
(note that the upper left plot of Fig. 4 shows the situation of two identical results). The
solid curve of the right-hand plots shows the combined result obtained using Eq. (16)
with λ = 0.6 and δ = 1.3, yielding E[r] = σ(r) = 1. For comparison, the dashed lines
show also the result obtained by the standard combination. The method described in this
paper, with parameters chosen by general considerations, tends to behave in qualitative
agreement with the expected point of view of a sceptical experienced physicist. As soon
as the individual results start to disagree, the combined distribution gets broader than
the standard combination, and might become multi-modal if the results cluster in several
places. However, if the agreement is somehow ‘too good’ (first and last case of Fig. 4) the
combined distribution becomes narrower than the standard result.
In order to get a feeling about the sensitivity of the results from the choice of
the parameters, two other sets of parameters have been tried, keeping the requirement
E[r] = 1, but varying σ(r) by ±50%: σ(r) = 0.5 is obtained for λ ≈ 1.4 and δ ≈ 2.1;
σ(r) = 1.5 is obtained for λ ≈ 0.4 and δ ≈ 1.1. The resulting p.d.f.’s of r are shown in
Fig. 3. The results obtained using these two sets of parameters on the simulated data of
Fig. 4 are shown in Fig. 5. We see that, indeed, the choice E[r] = σ(r) = 1 seems to be
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Individual results Eq. (16), λ = 0.6 and δ = 1.3
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Figure 4: Examples of sceptical combination of results. The plots on the left-hand side show
the individual results (in the upper plot the two results coincide). The plots on the right-hand
side show the combined result obtained using Eq. (16) with the constraint E[r] = σ(r) = 1
(continuous lines), compared with the standard combination (dashed lines).
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Eq. (16), λ = 1.4 and δ = 2.1 Eq. (16), λ = 0.4 and δ = 1.1
[σ(r) = 0.5] [σ(r) = 1.5]
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Figure 5: Combination of results obtained by varying the parameters of the sceptical combina-
tion.
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Figure 6: Sceptical perception of a single measurement having a standard deviation equivalent to
the standard combination of the top of Fig. 4. Note how the result differs from the combination
of the individual results.
an optimum, and the ±50% variations of σ(r) give results which are at the edge of what
one would consider to be acceptable. Therefore, we shall take the parameters providing
E[r] = σ(r) = 1 as the reference ones.
Another interesting feature of Eq. (16) is its behaviour for a single experimental
result, as shown in Fig. 6. For comparison, we have taken a result having a stated standard
deviation equal to 1/
√
2 of each of those of Fig. 4. Figure 6 has to be compared with the
upper right plots of Fig. 4. The sceptical combination takes much more seriously two
independent experiments, each reporting in an uncertainty σ, than a single experiment
performing σ/
√
2. On the contrary, the two situations are absolutely equivalent in the
standard combination rule. In particular, the tails of the p.d.f. obtained by the sceptical
combination vanish more slowly than in the Gaussian case, while the belief in the central
value is higher. The result models the qualitative attitude of sceptical physicists, according
to whom a single experiment is never enough to establish a value, no matter how precise
the result may be, although the true value might have more chance to be within one
standard deviation than the probability level calculated from a Gaussian distribution.
4 Application to ǫ′/ǫ
The combination rule based on Eq. (16) has been applied to the results about
Re(ǫ′/ǫ) shown in Table 1. As discussed above, our reference parameters are λ = 0.6
and δ = 1.3, corresponding to E[r] ≈ σ(r) ≈ 1. The resulting p.d.f. for e = Re(ǫ′/ǫ) ×
104 is shown as the thick continuous line of Fig. 7, together with the individual results
(dotted lines). For comparison, we also give the result obtained using the combination
rules commonly applied in particle physics. The grey-dashed line of Fig. 7 is obtained
with the standard combination rule [Eqs. (1) and (2)]. The thin continuous line has been
evaluated using the Particle Data Group (PDG) ‘prescription’ [19]. According to this rule,
the standard deviation (2) is enlarged by a factor given by
√
χ2/(N − 1), where χ2 is the
chi-2 of the data with respect to the average (1) and N is the number of independent
results.4)
We see that although the PDG rule gives a distribution wider than that obtained
4) Note that the ‘official’ world average obtained using the PDG recipe of (21.2± 0.46× 10−4 (see e.g.
[10, 11, 12]) differs from that given here because all five results of Table 1 are used here, as I do not
see any reason why the 1988 E731 result should be disregarded.
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Figure 7: Individual results compared with the standard combination (grey dashed), the PDG-
rescaled combination (solid thin) and the sceptical combination as described in this paper (solid
thick).
by the standard rule, the barycentres of the distributions coincide, thus not taking into
account that one of the results is quite far from where the others seem to cluster. Moreover,
the p.d.f. is assumed to be Gaussian, independently of the configuration of experimental
points. Instead, the sceptical combination takes into account better the configuration of
the data points. The peak of the distribution is essentially determined by the three results
which appear more consistent with each other. Nevertheless, there is a more pronounced
tail for small values of Re(ǫ′/ǫ), to take into account that there is indeed a result providing
evidence in that region, and that cannot be ignored.
A quantitative comparison of the different methods is given in Table 2, where the
most relevant statistical summaries are provided (average, mode, median, standard devi-
ation), together with some probability intervals. It is worth recalling that each of these
summaries gives some information about the distribution, but, when the uncertainty of
Table 2: Comparison of the different methods of combining the results.
Combination Mean (σ) Median Mode 99% range P [Re(ǫ′/ǫ < 0)]
± 34% range
Standard 21.4 (2.7) 21.4 21.4± 2.7 [14.3, 28.5] 5× 10−15
PDG rule [19] 21.4 (4.0) 21.4 21.4± 4.0 [11.0, 31.7] 5× 10−8
Sceptical 22.7 (3.5) 23.0 23.5± 3.4 [11.6, 30.5] 1.5× 10−6
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Figure 8: Dependence of the sceptical combination on the choice of the parameters. Continuous,
dotted and dashed lines are, in order: λ = 0.6 and δ = 1.3 [σ(r) = 1)]; λ = 0.4 and δ = 1.1
[σ(r) = 0.5)]; λ = 1.4 and δ = 2.1 [σ(r) = 0.5)]. The grey-dashed line gives, for comparison, the
result of the standard combination.
this result has to be finally propagated into other results (together with other uncertain-
ties), it is the average and standard deviation which matter.5) An interesting comparison
is given by the probability that Re(ǫ′/ǫ) is negative. The sceptical combination gives the
largest value, but still at the level of one part per million, indicating that, even in this con-
servative analysis, a positive value of the direct CP violation parameter seems ‘practically’
established.
The sensitivity of the result on the parameters of the combination formula can
be inferred from Fig. 8, where the results obtained changing σ(r) by ±50% are shown.
The combined result is quite stable. This is particularly true if one remembers that these
extreme values of parameters are quite at the edge of what one would accept as reasonable,
as can be seen in Fig. 5. Note that if one would like to combine the results taking also into
account the uncertainty about the parameters, one would apply Eq. (17). It is reasonable
to think that, since the variations of the p.d.f. from that obtained for the reference value
of the parameters are not very large, the p.d.f. obtained as weighted average over all the
possibilities will not be much different from the reference one.
Figure 9 and Table 3 give the results subdivided into CERN and Fermilab. In these
cases the difference between the standard combination and the sceptical combination
becomes larger, and, again, the outcome of the sceptical combination follows qualitatively
the intuitive one of experienced physicists. The sceptical combination of the CERN results
alone is better than that given by the standard one, thus reproducing formally the
5) The standard ‘error propagation’ is based on linearization, on the property of expected value and
variance under a linear combination and on central limit theory (the result of several contributions
will be roughly Gaussian). Therefore, propagating mode (or median) and 68% probability intervals
does not make any sense, unless the input distributions are Gaussian.
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Figure 9: Sceptical combination of CERN and Fermilab results (upper and lower plot, respec-
tively). The continuous line shows the result obtained by Eq. (16) and reference parameters. The
dashed and dotted lines are the results obtained by varying the standard deviation of r = σ/s by
+50% and −50%, respectively. The grey-dashed line shows the results obtained by the standard
combination rule.
Table 3: Comparison of the different methods of combining partial results. The symbol * means
that the distribution has less than 34.1% probability on the right side of the mode.
Combination Mean (σ) Median Mode 99% p. range P [Re(ǫ′/ǫ) < 0]
±34% p. range
Stand.
{
CERN
Fermilab
21.1 (4.8)
21.4 (2.7)
21.1
21.4
21.1 ± 4.8
21.4 ± 2.7
[8.6, 33.4]
[12.9, 30.1]
6× 10−6
8× 10−11
Scept.
{
CERN
Fermilab
21.0 (3.9)
23.0 (7.1)
21.0
25.2
21.1 ± 3.6
27.1+ ∗−4.9
[9.2, 32.5]
[2.7, 36.2]
2.5× 10−4
1.5× 10−3
14
instinctive suspicion that the uncertainties could have been overestimated. For the Fermi-
lab ones the situation is reversed. In any case, both partial combinations tend to establish
strongly the picture of a positive and sizeable Re(ǫ′/ǫ) value. Finally, note that the ±50%
variations in σ(r) produce in the partial combinations a larger effect (although not rele-
vant for the conclusions) than in the overall combination. This is due to the fact that the
variations produce opposite effects on the two subsets of data in the region of Re(ǫ′/ǫ)
around 20× 10−4.
5 Posterior evaluation of σi
An interesting by-product of the method illustrated above is the posterior evaluation
of the various σi, or, equivalently, of the various ri. Again, we can make use of Bayes’
theorem, obtaining
f(r | d, s, µ) = f(d | r, s, µ) · f◦(r | s, µ)∫
f(d | r, s, µ) · f◦(r | s, µ) dr , (18)
where r = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}. Since the initial status of knowledge is such that values of ri
are independent of each other, and they are independent of µ and s, we obtain
f◦(r | s, µ) = f◦(r) =
∏
i
f◦(ri) ≡
∏
i
f(ri | λ, δ) =
∏
i
2 λδ r
−(2 δ+1)
i e
−λ/r2i
Γ(δ)
, (19)
having used Eq. (12). As a shorthand for Eq. (19), we shall write in the following simply
f◦(r) =
∏
i f◦(ri).
Since the experimental results are also considered independent, we can rewrite
Eq. (18) as
f(r | d, s, µ) =
∏
i f(di | ri, si, µ) · f◦(ri)∫∏
i f(di | ri, si, µ) · f◦(ri) dr
=
∏
i f(di | ri, si, µ) · f◦(ri)∏
i
∫
f(di | ri, si, µ) · f◦(ri) dri . (20)
The marginal distribution of each ri, still conditioned by µ (and, obviously, by the exper-
imental values), is obtained by integrating f(r | d, s, µ) over all rj, with j 6= i. As a result,
we obtain
f(ri | d, s, µ) = f(di | ri, si, µ) · f◦(ri)∫
f(di | ri, si, µ) · f◦(ri) dri . (21)
Making use of Eqs. (10), (12) and (15) we get:
f(ri | d, s, µ) =
1√
2pi ri si
exp
[
− (di−µ)2
2 r2i s
2
i
]
· 2λδ r
−(2 δ+1)
i e
−λ/r2i
Γ(δ)
λδ√
2pisi
Γ(δ+1/2)
Γ(δ)
(
λ+ (di−µ)
2
2 s2i
)−(δ+1/2) . (22)
The final result is obtained by eliminating, in the usual way, the condition µ, i.e.
f(ri | d, s) =
∫
f(ri | d, s, µ) · f(µ | d, s) dµ . (23)
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Making use of Eq. (16), and neglecting in Eq. (22) all factors not depending on ri and µ,
we get the unnormalized result
f(ri | d, s) ∝ r−(2 δ+2)i e−λ/r
2
i
∫
exp
[
−(di − µ)
2
2 r2i s
2
i
] ∏
j 6=i
(
λ+
(dj − µ)2
2 s2j
)−(δ+1/2)
dµ . (24)
This formula is clearly valid for n ≥ 2. If this is not the case, the product over j 6= i
is replaced by unity, and the integral is proportional to ri. Equation (24) becomes then
f(r1 | d1, s1) ∝ r−(2 δ+1)1 e−λ/r21 , i.e. we have recovered the initial distribution (12). In fact,
if we have only one data point, there is no reason to change our beliefs about r. Only the
comparison with other results can induce us to change our opinion.
Once we have got f(ri | d, s) we can give posterior estimates of ri in terms of average
and standard deviations, and they can be compared with the prior assumption E[r] =
σ(r) = 1, to understand which uncertainties have been implicitly rescaled by the sceptical
combination.6) Convenient formulae to evaluate numerically first and second moments of
the posterior distribution of ri are given by
7)
E[ri] =
Γ(δ)
Γ(δ + 1/2)
·
∫ (
λ+ (di−µ)
2
2 s2i
)1/2∏
j
(
λ+
(dj−µ)2
2 s2j
)−(δ+1/2)
dµ
∫∏
j
(
λ+
(dj−µ)2
2 s2j
)−(δ+1/2)
dµ
(25)
E[r2i ] =
Γ(δ − 1/2)
Γ(δ + 1/2)
·
∫ (
λ+ (di−µ)
2
2 s2i
)∏
j
(
λ+
(dj−µ)2
2 s2j
)−(δ+1/2)
dµ
∫∏
j
(
λ+
(dj−µ)2
2 s2j
)−(δ+1/2)
dµ
. (26)
At this point it is important to anticipate the objection of those who think that it is
incorrect to infer n + 1 quantities (µ and r) starting from n data points. Indeed, there
is nothing wrong in doing so. But, obviously, the results are correlated, and they depend
also on the prior distribution of ri, which acts as a constraint. In fact we have seen above
that for n = 1 the result on r is trivial.
Figure 10 gives the final distributions of ri = σi/si for the four most precise deter-
minations of Re(ǫ′/ǫ) (the 1988 E731 result has not been plotted because it is very similar
to the NA31 one, as one can understand from Table 4), compared with the reference ini-
tial distribution having σ(r) = 1 (grey line in the plot). The distributions relative to the
CERN results are shown with continuous lines, the Fermilab ones by dots. In particular,
the one that has a substantial probability mass above 1 is the 1993 E731 result. Average
6) Note that it is incorrect to feed again into the procedure the rescaled uncertainties, as they come
from this analysis. The procedure has already taken into account all possible rescaling factors in the
evaluation of f(µ | d, s).
7) Note that, since
∏
j(. . .) of the integrands are proportional to f(µ | d, s), Eqs. (25)–(26) can be written
in the compact form
E[ri] =
Γ(δ)
Γ(δ + 1/2)
· Eµ
[(
λ+
(di − µ)2
2 s2i
)1/2]
E[r2i ] =
Γ(δ − 1/2)
Γ(δ + 1/2)
· Eµ
[
λ+
(di − µ)2
2 s2i
]
,
where Eµ[·] indicates expected values over the p.d.f. of µ.
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Figure 10: Final distributions of r corresponding to the four most precise results on Re(ǫ′/ǫ),
compared with the reference prior one (grey line), i.e. having E[ri] = σ(ri) = 1 ∀i. The continuous
lines refer to the CERN results, dotted lines to the Fermilab ones.
and standard deviations of the distributions are given in Table 4, also showing the values
that one would obtain with the other sets of parameters that we have considered to be
edge ones.
Once more, the results are in qualitative agreement with intuition: The CERN
curves are slightly squeezed below r = 1, as the uncertainty evaluation seems to be a bit
conservative. The Fermilab ones show instead some drift towards large r. In particular,
figure and table make one suspect that some contribution to the error has been overlooked
in the E731 data. Note that in this case the average value of the rescaling factor is smaller
than one could expect from alternative procedures which require the overall χ2 to equal
the number of degrees of freedom. The reason is the shape of the initial distribution of r,
which protects us against unexpectedly large values of the rescaling factors.
Table 4: Posterior estimation of r = σi/si starting from identical priors having E◦[r] = 1 and
σ◦(r) = 0.5, 1.0 and 1.5. The individual results are given by di ± si to be consistent with the
notation used throughout this paper.
Experiment di si Posterior E[ri] (σ(ri))
σ◦(r) = 0.5 σ◦(r) = 1 σ◦(r) = 1.5
E731 (1988) [2] 32 30 0.9 (0.4) 0.8 (0.5) 0.7 (0.5)
E731 (1993)[4] 7.4 5.9 1.6 (0.7) 1.9 (1.2) 2.1 (1.5)
NA31 (1988+1993)[5, 6] 23.0 6.5 0.9 (0.4) 0.8 (0.5) 0.8 (0.6)
KTeV (1999)[7] 28.0 4.1 1.2 (0.6) 1.2 (0.9) 1.2 (1.0)
NA48 (1999)[8] 18.5 7.3 0.9 (0.4) 0.9 (0.5) 0.9 (0.6)
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Figure 11: Combined result on Re(ǫ′/ǫ) compared with recent and very new theoretical calcu-
lations (see text).
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6 Discussion and conclusions
The problem of combining data which appear in mutual disagreement has been
analysed from a probabilistic perspective. We have started from the usual hypotheses on
which the well-known combination rule is based and we have seen that a possible solution
can be based on a suitable modelling of the uncertainty on the standard deviation which
describes the Gaussian likelihood. The complete status of uncertainty on the true value
resulting from the various pieces of information is quantified by a p.d.f. f(µ) which, in
our approach, does not have an a priori defined shape. This property allows one to obtain
results which never conflict with the intuitive judgement of experienced physicists. The
method described here also allows one to infer the ratio between the ‘true’ standard
deviation and the stated one, as a result of the mutual agreement of the data.
The application of this method to CP violation results from K0 → 2π shows that
the picture of a positive and sizeable value of Re(ǫ′/ǫ) survives a sceptical analysis. This
conclusion also holds if one considers separately CERN and Fermilab results. As far as
a number to summarize the result is concerned, the mass of probability is concentrated
around 23.5 × 10−4, with a ±3.4 × 10−4 interval having a 68% probability of containing
the true value. However the p.d.f. has a negative skewness that cannot be ignored. As a
consequence, the expected value is slightly below the mode, at 22.7×10−4. We would like
to re-state that what matters for uncertainty propagation is the expected value, together
with the standard deviation (3.5×10−4), and not the mode, or the median, and the ±34%
probability interval around either of them.
The 1999 experimental results on Re(ǫ′/ǫ) have indeed renewed the interest of the-
orists in the subject. The comparison of the combined result with recent [20, 21, 22] and
very new [23, 24, 25, 26, 12] theoretical evaluations is given in Fig. 11, an extension of the
updated version [27] of Fig. 2 of Ref. [11]. The vertical bands quantify somehow the un-
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Figure 12: Probability density functions resulting from the combined experimental information
about Re(ǫ′/ǫ) compared with 1999 theoretical evaluations by the Munich [23] and the Rome [12]
groups (the Rome NDR evaluation is very similar to the HV one).
e
certainty stated by the theoretical teams. The dark-grey bars should have the meaning of
68% central probability bands, although sometimes they are given as standard deviation
of a non-Gaussian distribution. The grey bars are obtained using a procedure that the
theorists call ‘scanning’ (see original papers), but which has no well-defined probabilistic
meaning. Since scanning produces very pessimistic uncertainty intervals, covering values
of Re(ǫ′/ǫ) which the authors hardly believe, one should be careful about concluding from
Fig. 11 that the experimental value of Re(ǫ′/ǫ) is well compatible with all the approaches
used to evaluate it. For example, Fig. 12, which shows the p.d.f.’s of the Munich and Rome
teams, alongside that obtained from the combined analysis of the experimental results,
gives a better idea of the mutual compatibility, and of how to interpret the grey bars
of Fig. 11 (note, in particular the positive skewness of the theory curves and negative
skewness of the experiment curve). The grey-dashed bar shows the upper 2σ tail of the
result of a recent evaluation [26] which gives a very large negative value, having also a
large uncertainty.
In conclusion, it seems that, given the well-known difficulties both in the experimen-
tal determination and in the theoretical evaluation, the overall picture is not dramatically
worrying (and therefore invoking new phenomenology seems premature). What it is prac-
tically certain is that direct CP violation in the neutral-kaon system is established. We
are all looking forward to an accurate theoretical explanation of the effect.
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